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The Retirement CD and Recent OCC Action Regarding
Banks-in-Insurance
I. INTRODUCTION
The landscape of financial services is changing. The constraints
once imposed by regulators to protect consumers are now being criti-
cized as measures that hamper consumer choice and hurt U.S. banks
in the global marketplace. Within the struggle for reform, several
layers of conflict exist. For example, the banking industry is lobbying
for an expanded role in insurance brokering and underwriting. On
the other hand, the insurance industry is seeking to protect its own
economic interests by opposing a broad interpretation of "the busi-
ness of banking." In fact some in the insurance industry are
considering leveling the playing field by gaining ground in banking.
In addition to industry interests, Congress, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Reserve Board (the
Fed) are struggling to advance the reform process. This Comment
considers examples of recent legal and administrative action in order
to define and explore the issues involved in financial services reform.
This Comment specifically examines the legal battle over the Re-
tirement Certificate of Deposit (Retirement CD), a recent OCC
Interpretive Letter, and new OCC regulations. The purpose of this
examination is to provide tools for understanding the broader context
within which the reform of financial services will take place.
The Retirement CD is a new investment vehicle developed by
banks that combines many of the traditional features of a certificate
of deposit and an annuity.2 The controversy surrounding the Retire-
1. The constraints under attack are specifically those in the Glass-Steagall Act.
Proposed legislation is aimed at financial modernization, seeking to allow banks to affili-
ate with securities firms and insurance companies under a holding company structure.
This same legislation would allow national banks to form operating subsidiaries to engage
in various brokering and underwriting activities. This financial modernization legislation
failed, but Congressional leaders vowed to renew their efforts in the 1997 term. See Jo-
anne Morrison, Leach Says OCC May Bog Down Financial Services Reform, BOND
BUYER, Dec. 5, 1996, at 2-4, available in 1996 WL 5644990 [hereinafter Morrison, Bog
Down]; Joanne Morrison, House Banking Chairman Is Readying A New Financial Mod-
ernization Bill; Leach Will Try to Repeal Glass-Steagall, Again, BOND BUYER, Dec. 30,
1996, at 4, available in 1996 WL 14935431 [hereinafter Morrison, House Banking Chair-
man].
2. See American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1068-71 (N.D. Ill.
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ment CD is generated by the fact that it is a hybrid derived from
products traditionally sold and distributed by different entities. Cer-
tificates of deposit are investments that fall within the bailiwick of
banks, and annuities are offered and underwritten primarily by insur-
ance companies. A change in the status quo would likely have a large
effect on the allocation of consumer investments in the industries.
The Retirement CD has been under fire since its development,
and in less than two years, the federal courts, the IRS, and Congress
have taken action against it? To understand the attention it has gar-
nered, one must place the Retirement CD in its proper context in the
ongoing battle between the banking industry and the insurance indus-
try. The two powerhouses squared off in a territorial dispute, and
after significant judicial inroads and some legislative progress, the
banking industry found itself losing the Retirement CD battle.4 The
primary reason for the attack on the Retirement CD was the conten-
tion that its creation was an effort by national banks to conquer new
ground in an area that was traditionally reserved to the insurance in-
dustry-the selling and underwriting of annuities. As such, the
Retirement CD became an instrument for compromise between the
two industries.5 At the same time, the introduction of the Retirement
CD spawned litigation at the state level.6
The courts have been involved in establishing and interpreting
some of the boundaries of the banking and insurance industries. In
fact, a review of the NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life
1995) (explaining terms and conditions of the Retirement CD); American Deposit Corp.
v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1996). For further discussion, see infra notes 25-39
and accompanying text.
3. For an example of the judicial action, see infra notes 83-160 and accompanying
text.
4. The judicial victories have come recently in two decisions. See NationsBank of
N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (affirming the determination of the
Comptroller of the Currency that national banks may sell annuities), Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996) (holding that a federal statute
granting national banks the power to sell insurance in towns with fewer than 5,000 people
preempts a state statute forbidding them to do so). The legislative progress came with a
price. Congress passed a major omnibus appropriations bill before adjourning at the end
of September 1996. Not included in the bill was language that would have required banks
that sell insurance to obtain licensure from state insurance regulators. However, the in-
surance industry won a provision stripping the Retirement CD of its FDIC insurance. See
GOP Leaders Agree on 99 Percent of SAIF, Reg.-Relief Package, Leach Says, 67 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 477 (Sept. 30, 1996). For a discussion of other legislative efforts,
see supra note 1, discussing other legislative efforts.
5. See supra note 4 for a discussion of the compromise struck in Congress' recent
omnibus appropriations bill.
6. For a discussion of some of the litigation, see infra notes 83-160 and accompany-
ing text.
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Ins.7 and Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson' opinions
suggests that banks forged a strong foothold into traditional insur-
ance territory by expanding the national commercial banks' ability to
sell annuities as agents. However, the Seventh Circuit refused to fur-
ther broaden the power of banks in American Deposit Corporation v.
Schacht (ADC),9 and in fact, it may have effectively narrowed the
powers of banks domiciled in the Seventh Circuit."
The Retirement CD is an innovative investment vehicle whose
hybrid nature makes it an ideal tool for testing the legal definitions of
"deposit" and "insurance" as well as the statutory framework within
which the banking and insurance industries function."1 In ADC, for
instance, the parties recognized the importance of legal definitions
and "toss[ed] about various names to denote their understanding of
the Retirement CD: deposit, investment, annuity, insurance. In so
doing, each side [attempted] to bring the Retirement CD within its
auspices.'02 The introduction of the Retirement CD by banks served
as a barometer for determining how far their recent legal momentum
could take them as they pushed into what was traditionally consid-
ered the insurance business. The opposition generated by the
Retirement CD served as a clear message to the banking industry
that the time for rapid judicial advancement had come to an end.
The battle between the banking and insurance industries shifted
to Congress, where efforts to pass a comprehensive financial mod-
ernization bill were thwarted by lack of consensus between the two
industries. 4 With the failure of legislative efforts, the OCC stepped
in and announced new regulations which could expand the powers of
7. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
8. 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).
9. 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1996).
10. See infra notes 83-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of ADC. The fol-
lowing states comprise the Seventh Circuit: Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
11. The clash in ADC involved interpretations and constructions of the National
Banking Act, see 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994), the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1994), and the Illinois Insurance Code, see 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (West
1993).
12. American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
13. Although the plaintiffs in ADC, American Deposit Corporation and Blackfeet
National Bank, structured their arguments around a variety of case law, the banking in-
dustry has, as a whole, gained most of its recent momentum from two Supreme Court
cases. See NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 513 U.S. 251 (1995); Barnett
Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).
14. See Rep. Leach: Treasury Misguided In Bank Regulation Approach, CAPITAL
MARKETS REPORT, Dec. 3,1996.
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the national banks through the use of operating subsidiaries.15 These
administrative efforts have also prompted a similar proposal from the
Federal Reserve Board for its state chartered banks, in effect circum-
venting Congressional efforts at comprehensive reform. 6
This Comment will first compare the Retirement CD with other
popular retirement savings options." Then it will examine the case
law surrounding the Retirement CD by focusing on American De-
posit Corp. v. Schacht8 and related cases. 9 Next, this Comment will
explore the roles of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Congress." Finally, it will examine the present status of the
Retirement CD and the future of similar products, with a particular
emphasis on the policy and practical implications that the new ad-
ministrative action will have on the battle for consumer territory
between banks and insurance companies.2
II. COMPARISON OF RETIREMENT INVESTMENTS
Nomenclature is a recurring issue in the Retirement CD debate.
Insurance companies and banks have clashed over classifying prod-
ucts under state and federal law in an effort to retain control over
their sale and distribution.' Insurance industry opposition to the Re-
tirement CD is based on the fact that it strongly resembles an
annuity, an investment vehicle which insurance companies have his-
torically sold and underwritten. Banks have recently made inroads
into the insurance industry by expanding their ability to sell annuities
as agents. The Retirement CD represents an effort by banks to move
into underwriting annuities and annuity-like products-a function
that commercial banks historically have not been allowed to under-
take under state insurance law.2
15. See John R. Wilke & Stephen E. Frank, Comptroller Lets Banks Into New Areas
But Restricts the Amount of Investment, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1996, at A2. For a discus-
sion of recent OCC actions, see infra notes 161-214 and accompanying text.
16. See Fed Proposal Cutting Restrictions on State Banks, CFO ALERT, Dec. 16, 1996.
17. See infra notes 22-82 and accompanying text.
18. 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. See infra notes 83-160 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 161-214 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
22- See American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(discussing nomenclature and control).
23. The underwriting issue is the same one considered in American Deposit Corp. v.
Schacht, 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Any investment can be a retirement investment.24 One could
have a Retirement Van Gogh or a Retirement Studabaker as well as
a Retirement Mutual Fund. However, the retirement savings goal of
these investments does not necessarily make them effective retire-
ment investments. For the purposes of this analysis, "retirement
vehicles" include investments with tax-advantaged status and specific
rules and terms regarding investor actions such as early withdrawal.
Included in this category are 401(k) plans, Individual Retirement Ac-
counts (IRA), annuities, and Retirement CDs. Although this is not
an exhaustive list of retirement investments, it covers the more
popular retirement plans and offers a useful comparison of restric-
tions, tax consequences, and payout options.
A. Retirement CD
Ignoring for the moment the battle between insurance compa-
nies and banks for territorial control, the Retirement CD was
essentially designed to be a tax-deferred retirement investment. For
instance, consider the typical Retirement CD marketed by banks like
Blackfeet National Bank (Blackfeet).' The CD required the cus-
tomer to make a minimum investment of $5000.26 The customer
selected a maturity date, which usually corresponded with his ex-
pected retirement.2 Interest accrued from the date of deposit and
was calculated under a formula tied to the five-year U.S. Treasury
Note.' The initial rate was in effect for one year and was adjusted
every five years thereafter.' Under IRS regulations in effect at the
time of its development and initial offering, the interest accrued by
the Retirement CD was to receive tax deferred status? Early with-
24. See generally JANE BRYANT QUINN, MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR MONEY
(1991) (discussing retirement planning and the various investments and plans available to
employees and other investors).
25. For a complete discussion of the Retirement CD and the recent Seventh Circuit
ruling, see ADC, 84 F.3d 834 (1996); see infra notes 83-160 and accompanying text.
26. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
27. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 836 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. See id.; see also ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
29. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
30. See id.; ADC, 84 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1996). The IRS has since proposed that
the Retirement CD be stripped of its tax deferred status. See 60 Fed. Reg. 17,731. Al-
though the proposed changes to section 1.1275-1(d) of title 26 of the Code of Federal
Regulations were included in the IRS' 1996 Business Plan, the proposed rule has yet to be
finalized. The proposed changes were challenged by Blackfeet in a separate case. See
Blackfeet National Bank v. Rubin, 890 F. Supp. 48 (D.D.C. 1995). The District Court held
that the bank was not denied administrative due process, and that "any issues raised by
proposed regulations were not ripe for judicial review inasmuch as there had been no
[Vol. 1
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drawal was subject to penalties and IRS treatment as taxable in-
come.3 1 At maturity, the customer was to be entitled to withdraw up
to two-thirds of the account balance, including interest accrued.a2
The remainder of the balance was to be disbursed to the customer in
the form of lifetime Scheduled Monthly Withdrawal Payments; in
effect, these payments were to establish a lifetime annuity with the
monthly payment amount determined by using the account balance,
the current monthly interest rate, the customer's age at maturity, and
the appropriate Society of Actuaries annuity table.33 The monthly
payments were to be fixed and guaranteed for the remainder of the
customer's life.' The customer was to be assured of receiving at least
the entire account balance regardless of lifespan. 3 If the customer
died prior to receiving the full account balance, the remainder of the
account was to be paid to his estate or a designated beneficiary. 6 For
tax purposes, the monthly payments were to be characterized as ap-
portioned from principal and interest.
When the Retirement CD was first offered, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured an amount equal to the cus-
tomer's deposits plus interest, but not the entire lifetime monthly
payment stream. 38 However, the present status of the Retirement CD
has changed significantly. Congressional action has stripped the Re-
tirement CD of FDIC insurance, and proposed IRS regulations
would eliminate the CD's tax-deferred status.39 Consequently, the
recent legal battles over nomenclature and control may have a less
significant impact on the Retirement CD than originally thought.
The true death knell for the Retirement CD would be a loss of tax-
deferred status, since that is an underlying goal of all retirement in-
vestment vehicles.
B. 401(k) Retirement Plans
The 401(k) retirement plan is a salary-deferral plan sponsored by
most large employers and many small ones. With a 401(k) plan, the
final agency action." Id- The decision was affirmed per curiain. See Blackfeet National
Bank v. Rubin, 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
31. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
32. See id.; see also ADC, 84 F.3d at 836 (7th Cir. 1996).




37. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
38. See id.
39. For further discussion, see supra note 30.
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employee agrees to set aside a portion of his salary for retirement;
that amount is exempt from current income taxes, and the earnings
(interest, dividends, and capital gains) are allowed to accumulate tax-
deferred.' Taxation generally occurs upon withdrawal." Some plans
may also allow for after-tax contributions, which will also enjoy tax-
deferred accumulation." The employees' maximum tax-deductible
contribution is set by the company and is subject to a legal ceiling
which is adjusted yearly for inflation." Under most 401(k) plans in
large companies, employers contribute to the employee's accounts by
matching a percentage of the employee's contribution up to a per-
centage of the employee's salary.'
In order to provide flexibility to investors, 401(k) plans typically
allow a wide array of investment choices and periodic opportunities
to switch from one investment vehicle to another.' Upon leaving a
company, 401(k) funds contributed by the employee can generally be
invested in that employee's next 401(k) plan or rolled-over into an
IRA.46 Notably, in these cases, employers' contributions are subject
to various restrictions which may prohibit full transfer of funds. In
addition, withdrawal of 401(k) funds prior to the age of fifty-nine and
one-half years old is only allowed when facing a financial
"hardship," 4 and the withdrawals are subject to a ten percent penalty
plus the payment of income tax on the withdrawn funds. The pen-
40. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 743.
41. See id. For further discussion, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
42. See id.
43. The ceiling in 1996 was approximately $9,500. It is important to note that contri-
butions are also limited by complex regulations that prohibit higher paid employees from
taking advantage of 401(k)'s if lower paid employees do not. In theory, this keeps the
plans open to all employees instead of having retirement plans serving simply as perqui-
sites for elite employees. In practice, it may simply reduce the ceiling on a highly paid
employee's contributions. See id. at 744; see also THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
LIFETIME GUIDE TO MONEY 193 (C. Frederic Wiegold ed., Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
1997) [hereinafter WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE].
44. See WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE, supra note 43, at 193.
45. See id.
46. For a discussion of IRA's, see infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
47. Some employers allow all of their contributions to be taken with a departing em-
ployee. Others vest their contributions based on length of time in the plan. Full vesting
usually occurs after seven years. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 745.
48. See id (listing several examples of hardships including: large medical expenses,
buying a principal residence, an impending college tuition bill, or a threat of eviction).
49. Although the payment of income tax is expected upon withdrawal, it can be a
"penalty" if taken early, depending on your tax bracket. The attractiveness of deferring
income tax until retirement is usually based on two factors: (1) the money you would
have paid in taxes remains invested and compounds into even greater returns, and (2)
upon retirement, the loss of a regular salary places many investors in a lower tax bracket
[Vol. I200
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alty can only be waived under certain circumstances and meeting the
conditions for a waiver does not negate the requirement of first
showing "hardship."'
The differences between the Retirement CD and the 401(k) plan
are significant. The key differences are as follows: (1) the Retire-
ment CD contributions/deposits are not made from pre-tax dollars;"
(2) the Retirement CD does not receive the benefit of employer con-
tributions;2 (3) the Retirement CD does not offer the investment
options that 401(k) plans enjoy;' and (4) the Retirement CD has no
deposit/contribution ceiling like the 401(k) plans.'
than they were in when they were working. This often results in a lower income tax bill.
Note that income tax is paid only on before-tax contributions.
50. Penalty loopholes include: total disability, death, early retirement at 55 or older,
divorce decree, medical expenses that exceed 7.5% of your adjusted gross income, or a
lifetime periodic withdrawal plan. The last loophole requires that the investor stick to the
plan for at least five years and until age 59.5. The investor can then change the payment
size or discontinue payments altogether. Although this flexibility sounds good, the reality
is that the investor is still tapping retirement savings for present financial needs and is
forced to drain the fund for at least five years. Unless middle-aged and desperate, even
loophole six falls into the undesirable category. Early retirement is the sole bright loop-
hole. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 759-60.
51. From a tax policy viewpoint, this simply creates a larger incentive to contribute to
401(k) employer plans than an independent vehicle such as the Retirement CD. A pre-
tax contribution reduces your tax bill by up to 35% of your contribution (depending on
your tax bracket). This savings is often used for analysis purposes as offsetting and re-
ducing your contribution. For example, for an investor in the 35% tax bracket, it would
cost $650 to make a $1000 contribution ($1000 contribution multiplied by 35% equals
$350 savings; $1000 subtracted by $350 equals $650 net cost). Keep in mind that the sav-
ings (or increased investing power) is further maximized by an employer contributions.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. The addition of employer contributions are practically similar to tax deductibility
in that the additional contribution increases the investing power of your own contribution.
Typical formulas include employer matching of 50% for a contribution of up to 6% of
your salary. See WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE, supra note 43, at 193.
53. The Retirement CD does offer a guaranteed return tied to the five-year U.S.
Treasury Note. This reduces diversification in exchange for guaranteed return. Needless
to say, this kind of trade-off is one that must be made by each individual investor. How-
ever, the same fixed-income guarantee can be obtained in a 401(k) by choosing the
Treasury Note itself as part of a broader investment portfolio.
54. This is the Retirement CD's primary advantage over the 401(k) as the Retire-
ment CD was originally offered. For high income investors or those needing to invest
large amounts to make up for lost time, passing up the benefits of employer contributions
and tax deductibility can be favorably offset by no limit on investment. In effect, though,
the lack of tax deductibility and employer contributions combined with limited diversifi-
cation makes the Retirement CD a valuable retirement tool for some high income or
conservative investors, but certainly not a candidate for an investor's primary retirement
vehicle.
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C. Individual Retirement Accounts
Although Individual Retirement Accounts are no longer univer-
sal tax shelters, they remain a valuable tax deduction and powerful
retirement vehicle for many investors. Currently, the IRA contribu-
tion is limited to $2000 per year for individuals and is tax deductible
only under certain conditions.5 Investors may take full advantage of
the tax deduction if they are not eligible to participate in a company
pension plan or if they do participate in a company plan but have an
adjusted gross income lower than $25,000 if single or $40,000 if mar-
ried.5 ' For participants with higher incomes, the tax deductibility is
reduced and completely phased out at $35,000 for single investors
and $50,000 for married investors.7
IRAs also have the advantage of being extremely flexible. They
can be established with a variety of institutions depending upon the
investment goals of the consumer.58  A "self-directed" IRA estab-
lished with a brokerage house offers the broadest number of
investment choices; frequent investment switching is limited only by
the cost of commissions on purchases and sales. 9 This flexibility can
be important to some investors. For instance, an employee with a
strong 401(k) program may be unable to invest in a particular vehicle
if it is not available in his company's offerings; a separate brokerage
house IRA would allow that employee to have the desired "extra"
55. The ceiling for contributions is $2,000 for each individual. A couple with only one
income can put away an additional $250 per year. In 1997, married couples are allowed to
contribute $4,000 per year even if one spouse is not employed. See QUINN, supra note 24,
at 753; see also WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE, supra note 43, at 8.
56. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 753.
57. See id. Investors may also make non-deductible contributions to an IRA. The
primary downside to non-deductible IRA contributions is tax filing complexities. These
headaches come in the form of an extra filing at year-end (Form 8606) and potentially
complicated withdrawal calculations. To avoid double taxation on after-tax IRA contri-
butions, these contributions are non-taxable upon withdrawal. However, if an investor
has made both deductible and non-deductible contributions, the calculations can be com-
plicated. Any withdrawal requires a prorating of the portion which is non-taxable using a
ratio that divides total non-deductible contributions by the total balance in the account.
See QUINN, supra note 24, at 753-54; see also WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE, supra note
43, at 579-80. Investors who are not eligible for the tax deduction must weigh the addi-
tional filing requirements with the benefits of tax deferral to decide if an IRA is still a
worthwhile endeavor. Since taxes are already a headache for most investors, the ability
to essentially reinvest earnings which would have been gobbled up by the IRS (tax defer-
ral) is a potentially powerful tool, especially as your income and tax bracket rises. The
extra headache is usually worth the gain.
58. Ordinary CD IRA's are offered by banks, savings associations, and credit unions.
Insurance companies offer annuity IRA's. Brokerage houses offer "self-directed" IRA's




Early withdrawals from an IRA are subject to tax penalties
similar to those incurred by the holder of a 401(k). Generally, in-
come taxes are due upon withdrawal of IRA funds and a ten percent
penalty is levied on investors who withdraw funds before they reach
fifty-nine and one-half years of age.6' Avoidance of early withdrawal
penalties is more difficult than for a 401(k). For an IRA, only total
disability, death, exorbitant medical expenses (more than seven and
one-half percent of adjusted gross income), or a lifetime payment
schedule will help you escape the penalty. 62 The early retirement and
divorce options present under a 401(k) plan are not available in an
IRA. As with any early withdrawal of tax-advantaged retirement
funds, only careful thought and planning will minimize the cost to the
investor.
One of the advantages that the 401(k) enjoys over the Retire-
ment CD is not present in the IRA: employer contributions.63 IRAs
also have a lower investment ceiling than the 401(k) and produce tax
deductibility for a much smaller number of investors.6' As a result,
the primary advantage that an IRA has over the Retirement CD is
breadth of investment options. However, given the limited invest-
ment amount allowed for IRAs, the Retirement CD could still serve
an important role for high income investors with a penchant for
heavy retirement savings or tax-deferred investment.
D. Tax-Deferred Annuities
Annuities come in many forms. For purposes of this discussion,
analysis will focus on tax-deferred,6 fixed,' single-premium' annui-
60. See WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE, supra note 43, at 87. IRA's will usually
serve as an additional retirement investment rather than as an investor's primary retire-
ment vehicle. The 401(k) plans carry a higher maximum investment, guaranteed tax
deductibility, and the potential for employer matching. These features make 401(k)'s the
better choice for savings up to the 401(k) limit. Additional funds could then be invested
in an IRA.
61. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 756.
62. See id. For further discussion, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. For a comparison of the Retirement CD and the 401(k), see supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text.
64. Investors who benefit from tax deductible IRA contributions are primarily ones
who are not eligible for company plans or those who are in lower income brackets.
65. Tax-deductible annuities are available to some religious, charitable, or educa-
tional organizations enrolled in 403(b) plans. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 752.
66. Fixed annuities pay a "fixed" rate of interest that is set by the company and can
be changed by the company. Variable annuities allow the investors to put their money
into stocks, bonds, or mutual funds and to receive the interest from those vehicles. See
1997]
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ties, since these annuities have terms very similar to those of the Re-
tirement CD as it was originally offered.' Contributions to annuities
are not subject to any limits, although annuities generally have mini-
mum required investments. Contributions to annuities are made
from after-tax dollars. The tax advantage is in tax-deferred accumu-
lation, which also comes with the concomitant IRS penalties for early
withdrawal.69 The standard ten percent penalty on earnings with-
drawn before age fifty-nine and one-half applies to annuities, and
avoidance of the withdrawal penalty can only be accomplished
through death, disability, or a lifetime payment schedule.0 Regular,
periodic withdrawals, such as quarterly payments over the investor's
lifetime, are treated partly as taxable income and partly as return of
capital." If an investor makes irregular, unscheduled withdrawals,
then the entire amount is treated as taxable income until the total
amount of earnings have been withdrawn.' The remainder is treated
as return of the investor's original investment.' In addition to IRS
penalties, the company issuing the annuity also levies penalties for
early withdrawal. Penalties vary, but a typical system will feature a
sliding scale of interest penalties which decrease over time.74
Withdrawal options for tax-deferred annuities vary considerably
and some are taxed more aggressively than others.75 One option is
the straight-life annuity. This plan pays the investor a fixed amount
monthly, quarterly, or annually for as long as the annuitant lives.
This is the format that is available under the Retirement CD for the
amount not taken as a lump sum upon maturity. 6 The risk for the
investor is that he will not live to full life expectancy, resulting in the
underwriting company retaining any balance upon his "premature"
QUINN, supra note 24, at 764.
67. Single-premium annuities are purchased with a lump sum payment whereas flexi-
ble-premium annuities allow periodic and irregular contributions. See id.
68. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text for the terms and conditions of the
Retirement CD.
69. Within tax-deferred accumulation is the inherent potential advantage of with-
drawing money and paying income taxes after retirement, when employment related
income has fallen dramatically. These retirees sometimes enjoy a lower tax bracket upon
retirement.




74. For example, there might be a 7% penalty during the first year, 6% the second
year, etc. until the penalty phases out after the seventh year.
75. See QUINN, supra note 24 at 800.
76. See supra note 33-36 and accompanying text.
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death. For the company, the risk is that payments must continue un-
til death. If the investor outlives his actuarial life expectancy, the
company could suffer a loss.' It is this risk which the ADC court
chose to characterize as mortality risk for the purpose of character-
izing annuities as insurance.' Annuity funds can also be withdrawn
as annuities "for life or a period certain,"79 installment payments,'
aperiodic payments,"1 or lump sum withdrawals.2
Annuities strongly resemble the Retirement CD. Potential dif-
ferences include the initial fees charged by many annuities and the
early insurance company withdrawal penalties. The two share many
of the same advantages-no ceiling on investment-and disadvan-
tages-IRS early withdrawal penalties and no tax-deductibility of
initial contributions. A dramatic disadvantage of the Retirement
CD, in comparison to annuities, is the proposed loss of IRS tax-
deferred status. The loss of tax-deferred status essentially eliminates
the effectiveness and marketability of the Retirement CD as a re-
tirement investment.
III. RETIREMENT CD LITIGATION: AMERICAN DEPOSIT CORP. V.
SCHACHT
American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht 3 involved Illinois' ban on the
sale of the Retirement CD. The case dealt specifically with whether
the Retirement CD, considered an annuity by the court, was properly
classified as insurance, and therefore subject to state regulation under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court's analysis in ADC reflects
the kind of debate which is taking place on a broader level in the fi-
nancial reform process. As traditional investment classifications are
re-examined, policy-makers must decide what consumer and business
77. See QuINN, supra note 24, at 800.
78. See supra notes 83-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of ADC.
79. This option guarantees the annuitant a periodic income for life or a fixed number
of years, whichever is longer. For example, "for life or ten years certain" pays the inves-
tor a periodic income. If he dies before the ten years passes, a designated beneficiary
receives the payments for the remainder of the ten years certain. A variant on this option
is what the Retirement CD offered-a cash refund annuity. There, the designated bene-
ficiary gets the balance of the annuity in a lump sum cash payment upon the death of the
investor. See QUINN, supra note 24, at 800.
80. Installment payments pay the investor a fixed number of payments over a fixed
period of time. Any balance left at death goes to a designated beneficiary. See id. at 801.
81. Aperiodic payments allow the investor to withdraw money whenever they want.
The remainder at death goes to a designated beneficiary. See id.
82. "Take the money and run." Id.
83. 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1996).
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interests need to be protected, and how the allocation of control over
different investment vehicles impacts those interests.
American Deposit Corporation (ADC), of Pine, Colorado, de-
veloped the Retirement CD and licensed the product to Blackfeet
National Bank, a small, national bank located on the Blackfeet In-
dian Reservation in Browning, Montana.' At the time of its initial
offering, the Retirement CD was to receive not only tax-deferred
status from the IRS, but also FDIC insurance protection from the
federal governmentYs' Blackfeet began marketing the Retirement CD
in Illinois in 1994.8 In a cease and desist order of December 9, 1994,
the Acting Director of Insurance for the State of Illinois stated that
by selling and underwriting the Retirement CD, Blackfeet and ADC
were engaged in the business of insurance and subject to state regula-
tion."7 The basis for this order was a provision of the Illinois
Insurance Code," which provided that "no company shall transact
any business of insurance until it has received a certificate of author-
ity" from the Director of Insurance. 9 Under the Illinois Insurance
Code, a national bank like Blackfeet could not qualify for a certifi-
cate of authority and, therefore, could not sell or underwrite
annuities.+ ADC and Blackfeet responded by filing a complaint
against the Acting Director of Insurance for the State of Illinois on
January 11, 1995, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.91
The district court held that "the Retirement CD is an appropri-
ate subject for regulation under the Illinois Insurance Code and that
the National Bank Act does not direct otherwise. ' ,1z The U.S. Magis-
trate defined the issue as "whether the Retirement CD is an
insurance-type instrument subject to state regulation or a certificate
of deposit which, under the Bank Act, would be outside state regula-
tion."93 The district court emphasized that labeling the Retirement
CD a deposit, investment, annuity, or insurance was not dispositive 4
Instead, the court looked to the "nature of the product to determine
84. See American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (N.D. I11. 1995);
American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834,836 (7th Cir. 1996).
85. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1068; ADC, 84 F.3d at 836.
86. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1068.
87. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 836 (7th Cir. 1996).
88. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (West 1993).
89. Id.
90. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 836-37.
91. See ADC, 887 F. Supp. at 1068.
92 Id. at 1082.
93. Id. at 1068.
94. See id. at 1074.
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whether or not that nature makes it an appropriate subject for regula-
tion under the Insurance Code [of Illinois]."" The magistrate
concluded that "an annuity can be called an insurance product when
it involves not only a mortality risk to annuitant and issuer, but [also]
includes a guaranteed fixed return."96 The magistrate further held
that the National Bank Acte did not preempt the state Insurance
Code and that, even if it did, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
"immunized" the Code from preemption."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court in a split decision.'"3 The Seventh Circuit appropriately charac-
terized the case as one arising out of tension "between activities
arguably authorized by the Bank Act and activities that individual
states have a legitimate interest in regulating."'' This "tension" was
the friction which had developed between the banks and insurance
companies as they fought over consumer territory in the rapidly
changing financial services landscape.' 2 The court assumed, argu-
endo, that the National Bank Act authorizes the sale of annuities and
recognized that federal law preempts a conflicting state law under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution. 3 However, the
court noted that an exception to the ordinary rule of federal preemp-
tion exists under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'" Under that Act, the
"business of insurance" is to be regulated by the several States and
"[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or su-
persede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically related to
the business of insurance."'0' The court sought to resolve three is-
95. Id. at 1075.
96. Id. at 1078 (citing SEC v. Variable Ann. Ins., 359 U.S. 65, 71-73 (1959); Otto v.
Variable Ann. Life Ins., 814 F2d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir. 1986)).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1994).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
99. American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1079-82 (N.D. I1. 1995).
100. See American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 837.
102. As financial modernization reform continues to be hammered out, the same ten-
sion exists between Congress and administrative regulatory agencies like the OCC and
the Federal Reserve Board. See infra notes 161-223 and accompanying text for more
detail on the changing landscape of financial services and the conflict between banks and
insurance companies.
103. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 837 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,
116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); Easton v.
Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903)).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
105. ADC, 84 F.3d at 838 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994)).
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sues: (1) whether the pertinent sections of the Insurance Code were
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance; (2)
whether the pertinent provisions of the Bank Act specifically related
to the business of insurance; and (3) whether the Retirement CD was
properly considered the business of insurance."°
The court relied upon SEC v. National Securities, Inc.'0 7 for a
definition of the "business of insurance." The National Securities
Court held that "statutes aimed at protecting or regulating [the rela-
tionship between insurer and insured], directly or indirectly, are laws
regulating the 'business of insurance.' "o8 The National Securities
Court further held that laws regulating the business of insurance were
laws which "possess the end, intention, or aim of adjusting, managing,
or controlling the business of insurance."" 9 The ADC court found
that the Illinois Insurance Code prohibited companies from selling
insurance in Illinois without prior approval of the Department of In-
surance in order to regulate insurance and protect the residents of
Illinois from the acts of unauthorized insurers.1 Thus, the ADC
court held that the pertinent provisions of the Illinois Code were en-
acted to regulate the relationship between insurers and insureds and
were, therefore, properly regulating the "business of insurance."'
The second issue before the court was whether Section 24 of the
National Bank Act "specifically relate[d] to the business of insur-
ance" under section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Under
the National Bank Act, banks' power to sell annuities is based on the
power to accept deposits and enter into contracts.12 The court con-
trasted the general power to accept deposits with the power to sell
annuities granted by 12 U.S.C. § 92 in the Barnett Bank opinion."' In
that case, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 92 of the Bank
Act expressly permitted national banks to sell insurance in towns
with populations of 5000 or less, and contained specific rules govern-
ing that activity.14 In light of the Barnett Bank decision, the court
concluded that the grant of power in the ADC case was not a grant of
106. See id.
107. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
108. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453,460 (1969).
109. Id.
110. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 838. The Illinois Insurance Code provision at issue is 215
ILL COMP. STAT. 5/24 (West 1993).
111. ADC,84F.3d at838.
112. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) and (third).
113. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).
114. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 843 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,
116 S. Ct. 1103, 1111-12 (1996)).
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specific power to sell or otherwise engage in the business of insur-
ance.
115
Circuit Judge Cumming extensively explored the third issue-
whether the sale of annuities was properly considered the business of
insurance. Not surprisingly, the Illinois Insurance Code "expressly
includes annuities in its definition of life insurance.'. 16 However, the
"meaning of 'insurance' under the [McCarran-Ferguson Act] is a fed-
eral question" and required an independent analysis."7
The plaintiffs, ADC and Blackfeet, had relied upon NationsBank
of N.C. v. Variable Annuities Life Ins. Co."8 to assert that the Su-
preme Court had already declared that annuities were not the
"business of insurance."".9 The ADC majority did not read the Na-
tionsBank holding as broadly and distinguished it from ADC in two
ways. First, the court stated that the NationsBank "holding was lim-
ited to the brokering, not underwriting, of annuities."'2 Second, the
NationsBank holding "was limited to whether federal law precluded a
national bank from brokering annuities, not whether a bank doing so
... would be subject to state regulation.''
Unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' reliance on NationsBank, the
court turned to a tripartite standard announced by the Supreme
Court in both Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno'" and Group Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co."Z The criteria set forth in Pireno
were: "(1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured;
115. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 843.
116. Id. at 838; 215 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/4(a) (West 1993).
117. ADC, 84 F.3d at 838 (quoting SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65,
69 (1969)).
118. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
119. ADC, 84 F.3d at 839.
120. Id. The NationsBank Court is quoted as stating that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency specified that NationsBank would act only as agent and would not have a principal
stake in the annuities in order not to incur any interest rate or actuarial risk. This would
keep the practice within traditional banking practices. Note, however, that under new
OCC regulations, a bank may set up an operating subsidiary and potentially enter the
annuities market as principal and agent. To do this, the bank would be required to obtain
prior approval from the OCC and meet certain eligibility requirements. See infra notes
186-214 and accompanying text for an discussion of the new OCC regulations. Also note
that the new rules would not help Blackfeet in this situation since they sought to sell and
underwrite the annuities without the formation of an operating subsidiary.
121. ADC, 84 F.3d at 839.
122. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
123. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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and (3) whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry.
, 124
The ADC court stated that the "most important" factor in de-
termining what constitutes the "business of insurance" was whether it
spread policyholder risk." The court then engaged in an analysis of
life insurance and annuities as "mirror images" of each other, with
the common element of both being the assumption of mortality
risk."2 The court did not see payment upon death and payments until
death as significantly different. Instead, it viewed the common use of
actuarial tables as an indication of the prevalence of mortality risk.127
It concluded that "the Retirement CD spreads policyholder risk in a
manner similar to typical insurance and thus satisfies the first crite-
rion of the Pireno test."12
The court quickly dispensed with the second and third prongs of
the Pireno test.12 9 It concluded that the second prong of the test was
satisfied because the Retirement CD is the "very document that evi-
dences" the relationship between insurer and insured and is therefore
an "integral part" of that relationship 1 0 The third prong was also
met since virtually all annuities are sold by insurance companies. The
court explained that states regulate annuities under insurance laws
because consumer protection interests mandate that both insurance
and annuity issuers maintain sufficient reserves and careful planning
to remain solvent for their policyholders."' Satisfying the Pireno test
allowed the Retirement CD to be properly classified as the "business
of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
32
The court resolved the three issues before it by holding that: (1)
the relevant Illinois Insurance Codes were enacted for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance; (2) the Bank Act does not spe-
124. ADC, 84 F.3d at 839 (citing Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129).
125. Id. at 840.
126. See id. The court defined the assumption of mortality risk as the risk assumed by
the life insurance issuer that the policyholder will die before paying enough in premiums
to cover the policy payout and the risk assumed by the annuity issuer that the annuitant
will outlive his or her life expectancy and consume more annuity payments than the an-
nuitant invested (plus interest). See id. at 840-41.
127. See id. at 841.




132. Id. at 843.
133. See id. at 838.
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cifically relate to the business of insurance;" and (3) the Retirement
CD, as an annuity, is properly classified as the business of insur-
ance.13' Given these conclusions, the court held that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act reversed the rule of federal preemption and allowed
the Illinois Insurance Code to trump the National Bank Act as inter-
preted by the Comptroller of the Currency. 3
The dissent by Judge Flaum focused on two areas to which the
majority devoted little attention: (1) current literature and case
law,37 and (2) the nature of annuities as consumer products.138 Judge
Flaum recognized the limitations of the NationsBank holding.
3
1
However, he chose to glean more from the opinion than did the ma-
jority. For example, Judge Flaum said that "the NationsBank Court
accepted the conclusion of the Comptroller of the Currency that an-
nuities are widely recognized as 'investment products.' ,,..0 He also
pointed out that Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court in
NationsBank, described annuities as the setting aside of money for
retirement or a "rainy day"-the deferral of consumption for a future
income stream. 4' In addition, he noted that the Court likened annui-
ties to sophisticated bank accounts, and the Court stated that banks,
by offering annuities to their customers, "are essentially offering fi-
nancial investment instruments of the kind congressional
authorization permits them to broker."'42
134. See id. at 843.
135. See UdL at 838-43.
136. See id. at 844.
137. Included in "current literature" are legal encyclopedias, insurance treatises, and
legal and popular dictionaries.
138. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 845-65 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
139. See kL at 847. The majority correctly noted that the NationsBank holding was
limited to the selling of annuities as an agent and did not involve state regulation. See id.
140. Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Ann. Life Ins., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814
(1995)).
141. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 847.
142. Id. Judge Flaum also addressed several other conclusions advanced by the Na-
tionsBank Court. These conclusions included: (1) annuities should not be classified as
insurance solely because they are sold predominantly by insurance companies; see id. at
847-48 (citing NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. at 814); (2) regulation of annuities under state in-
surance law is largely contextual (since most are sold by insurance companies), see ADC,
84 F.3d at 848 (citing NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. at 814); (3) the "key feature of insurance is
that it indemnifies against loss" while annuities "serve an important investment purpose
and are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell;" see ADC, 84
F.3d at 848 (citing NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. at 817); and (4) "mortality risk" is not the
hallmark of whether a product is properly considered "insurance." See ADC, 84 F.3d at
848 (citing NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. at 816).
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The ADC dissent followed its analysis of NationsBank with a
comprehensive analysis of modem literature and case law comparing
insurance and annuities."' Unlike the majority, the dissent concluded
that legal and popular literature fail to classify annuities and insur-
ance in the same category and that "the selling of a specialized
annuity by a national bank is not 'the business of insurance.' ""'4 The
dissent also addressed two points regarding the law relied upon by
the majority. 45 These points included the Supreme Court's under-
emphasis of mortality risk as a dispositive characteristic of insurance,
and the definition of risk spreading as the transfer of "insurance
risk." Specifically, the dissent addressed the risk of loss or damage
due to a contingent event.'46
The dissent also recognized another element in the Retirement
CD analysis: context. Aside from NationsBank, most of the cases
cited and relied upon by the majority were ones which specifically
considered the activities of insurance companies." The only case to
come before the Supreme Court which involved the state regulation
of a non-insurance company under the McCarran-Ferguson power to
regulate "the business of insurance" was Barnett Bank, which in-
yoked McCarran-Ferguson's express exception for federal legislation
which deals "specifically" with the business of banking.'9
Compared to the dissent, the majority's analysis seemed strained
and, at times, circular. One limitation it faced was recognized by the
dissent. The ADC majority was attempting to apply "insurance" law
precedent to a non-insurance company's activity.'49 The court gave
only brief consideration to the Illinois Insurance Code before con-
cluding that it was enacted for the purpos of regulating the business
of insurance.' While this conclusion seems intuitively correct, it
took the Illinois Code at face value and did not inquire into the spe-
cific intent of the Code provisions in question. The Chief Counsel for
the OCC interpreted provisions in the Texas Insurance Code which
143. SeeADC, 84 F.3d at 848-58.
144. Id. at 848.
145. As was already discussed, the dissent understood NationsBank to be relevant
authority that contradicted the majority's conclusions.
146. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 853-55.
147. See id. at 855-58. The three prong Pireno test, for example, was "directed at ...
an insurance company practice-not a practice by a non-insurance company .... The
Retirement CD, at least on its face, does not involve 'policyholders,' a 'policy relation-
ship,' an 'insurer,' or an 'insured.'" Id. at 857.
148. Id. at 858 n.25.
149. See id. at 855-58.
150. See id. at 838.
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also limited national banks' ability to sell annuities as not intending
to regulate "the business of insurance," but instead to regulate na-
tional banks by effectively negating the existing corporate authority
of national banks to sell annuities."
The ADC majority also relegated the expansive literature on in-
surance and annuities to a footnote.152 The majority described these
sources as relatively inconclusive with regard to the specific issue of
"whether annuities are properly considered 'insurance' for the pur-
poses of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and state regulation." '53 The
fact that no source specifically dealt with the McCarran-Ferguson
Act did not rob the work of relevance. The general question before
the court was whether annuities were insurance products or invest-
ment products. Any application of that question to the specific intent
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act should have been done after starting
with reliable and authoritative background. Without this back-
ground, the majority applied the Pireno test in a vacuum."
The dissent forcefully argued that, when addressing the
"business of insurance," the Supreme Court has been more con-
cerned with "insurance risk," the risk of loss or damage from a
contingent event, than with mortality risk.55 In addition, the major-
ity's analysis never adequately addressed the actual nature of an
annuity. The Supreme Court has recognized that annuities are pur-
chased as investment vehicles, oftentimes for retirement savings. 56
Consumers generally do not purchase insurance with the same goals
in mind."' By equating insurance with investments, the majority in-
correctly assessed consumer purchasing rationale.'
151. OCC Interpretive Letter 749, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
81-114 (Sept. 13, 1996); see infra notes 161-214 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of recent OCC interpretation and action in the banking and insurance areas.
152. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 840 n.4.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 839-43 (discussing the Pireno test).
155. Id. at 853-55. Insurance guards against loss from fire, theft, accident, or other
contingent events. The mortality risk emphasized by the majority is one recognized by
insurers in setting prices and interest rates.
156. See NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Ann. Life Ins., 115 S. Ct. 810, 816 (1995).
See supra notes 22-82 for a comparison of popular retirement investment vehicles.
157. Consumers do not purchase life insurance to provide for retirement, they buy it to
provide for their families should they die.
158. The majority describes a lifetime annuity purchase as insurance against "no
longer having sufficient money produced by [one's] assets" to be compared favorably with
life insurance, which guards against no longer having the money earned by a dead bread-
winner. ADC, 84 F.3d at 841. It also argues that life insurance and the Retirement CD
both insure against a single, contingent event: life insurance against the loss of life and
the Retirement CD against a decline in the market, since it locks in a guaranteed rate of
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The Pireno test does not adequately or convincingly address the
unique and novel issues presented in the ADC case.' By constrain-
ing the bulk of its argument to the Pireno test, the majority
unnecessarily ignored broader legal and popular authority. Perhaps
the dissent explained this best when it stated: "Neither the majority
nor the appellee has provided legal authority for the proposition that
a state can regulate as the 'business of insurance' an activity by a na-
tional bank that the Comptroller of the Currency has specifically
found to be 'the business of banking.' 06
IV. RECENT OCC ACTION
The battle over annuity sales and underwriting left the courts in
the Fall of 1996 and returned to the legislature. Two separate OCC
actions increased the power of national banks and began an adminis-
trative effort at financial services modernization. The first OCC
action was OCC Interpretive Letter #749.6 '
This Letter addressed many of the same issues that the ADC
court considered and took issue with the holdings of the Seventh Cir-
cuit.'62 The OCC's position, as set forth in the Letter, is that Section
24 of the National Bank Act'63 preempts Texas insurance laws, which
prevent national banks from selling annuities as agents.' 6' The OCC
return. See id. The argument that the Retirement CD is insurance against a single
event-a decline in the market-is strained and ignores both the intent of consumers in
buying the Retirement CD (tax deferred investment for retirement) and the fact that
annuities are not always heralded for rates that outperform the market or guard against a
recession or spiraling interest rates. See also QUINN, supra note 24, at 766 (discussing the
impact of fees on an annuity's actual rate of return).
159. For example, the satisfaction of the second and third prongs of the Pireno test are
not convincingly argued by the majority. The fact that the Retirement CD is the
"document which evidences" a relationship between its issuer and the investor simply
classifies it as a contract. ADC, 84 F.3d at 842. The court must first conclude that the
Retirement CD's annuity features make it "insurance" before any "policy relationship"
can exist between the "insurer and the insured." The dissent aptly pointed out that the
Pireno test is limited by the fact that it was articulated for participants in an insurance
contract, not an investment relationship. Id. at 857. The third prong was more fatally
circular. The majority stated that the third prong was met "because the Retirement CD is
an annuity, virtually all of which are issued by insurance companies." Id. at 842. That
conclusion directly contradicted the Supreme Court, which stated that "[t]he sale of a
product by an insurance company does not inevitably render the product insurance."
NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. 810, 814. The dissent explained the third prong correctly: "It
simply restates the very question before us: should the selling of [annuities] be limited to
entities within the insurance industry?" ADC, 84 F.3d at 857.
160. ADC, 84 F.3d at 864-65.
161. See OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151.
162. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 864-65.
163. 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1994).
164. See id.
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concludes that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not insulate the
relevant Texas Insurance Code provisions from preemption because
annuities are not "insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, and, even if annuities were insurance for the purposes
of McCarran-Ferguson, "laws that have the effect of negating or im-
pairing corporate powers of an entire class of entity-in this case the
authority of national banks to sell annuities-are not laws 'regulating
the business of insurance' within the meaning of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act."'65
The OCC first asserted that the National Bank Act gave national
banks the power to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking."'" The Comptroller of
the Currency already concluded that the National Bank Act granted
banks the power to sell fixed and variable annuities as agents.'67 The
OCC interpreted NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Company" as upholding the Comptroller's
interpretation that section 24 of title 12 of the U.S.C. gave banks the
power to serve as agents for fixed and variable annuities.'69 Acting
upon the assumption that banks have the power to sell annuities, the
OCC Letter turned to the issue of the McCarran-Ferguson preemp-
tion.
As noted in ADC, the McCarran-Ferguson Act protects certain
state insurance-related laws from federal preemption.'70 In this case,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act would insulate the Texas Insurance
Code provisions from federal preemption if the Texas restrictions on
the sale of annuities by banks regulated the business of insurance.
The OCC's position is that annuities are not insurance products and
that the relevant Texas Insurance Code provisions are not regulating
the business of insurance. Instead, according to the OCC, they are
attempting to regulate the power of national banks as a "class of enti-
ties.''
The OCC's argument that annuities are not insurance began
with the Supreme Court's opinion in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
165. 0CC Intrepretive Letter 749, supra note 151.
166. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 24(7).
167. See id.
168. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
169. OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
171. See OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151. The Texas Insurance Code
sections specifically addressed by Ms. Williams in the OCC Letter are Sections 3.01, 3.75
and 21.07-1.
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Insurance Co. of America.7 In SEC, the Court held that variable an-
nuities are not insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.' 3 The OCC acknowledged that the holding did not specifically
address the case of fixed annuities as insurance, but contended that
the vast majority of authorities would come to the conclusion that
neither type of annuity is insurance. 4 The OCC also briefly looked
at the purpose of annuity contracts from the point of view of the con-
sumer, an analysis which the ADC majority did not adequately
undertake. The OCC specifically noted that annuitants are not
seeking to indemnify themselves against loss but instead to guarantee
to themselves a long-term return on their investment. 5 The OCC
suggested that "[m]ost commonly, annuities are marketed as a tax-
sheltered means of saving for retirement."'76 The OCC concluded
this portion of its analysis by stating that "modem annuities, though
more sophisticated than the standard savings bank deposits of old,
answer essentially the same need. By providing customers with the
opportunity to invest in one or more annuity options, banks are es-
sentially offering financial investment instruments of the kind
congressional authorization permits them to broker.'""
The OCC then expressly attacked the ADC decision, stating that
it "fundamentally mistook these essential distinctions between annui-
ties and insurance."'78  Three of the court's reasons for defining
annuities as insurance were briefly addressed and dismissed, and the
ADC court's decision was summarized as "analytically flawed to a
profound degree."''7 The OCC finished this portion of its statement
with the argument that "[a]nnuities are not part of the 'business of
insurance' simply because they have historically been offered pri-
marily by insurance companies. '
172. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
173. See OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151.
174. A large portion of the OCC Interpretive Letter 749 is devoted to an analysis of
popular and legal authority dedicated to annuities and insurance. The sources cited are
very similar to those relied upon by the ADC dissent and include: (1) dictionaries
(BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY, the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY); (2) legal encyclopedias
(C.J.S. and AM. JUR.); (3) case law regarding mortality risk, investment risk and federal
tax law; and (4) legal treatises (COUCH ON INSURANCE and APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE).
175. See OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing NationsBank v. Variable Ann. Life Ins., 115 S. Ct. 810,814 (1995)).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. This closely parallels the dissent in ADC. See American Deposit Co. v.
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The OCC also stated that the Texas Insurance Code provisions
which effectively prohibited national banks from selling annuities did
not regulate the business of insurance. The OCC found that "[s]tate
regulation that negates or impairs the existing corporate activity of an
entire class of entity is regulation of that type of entity, not regulation
of the activity that constitutes the 'business of insurance.' ,11 The
"core of the 'business of insurance' is the relationship between in-
surer and insured ... [for example,] the type of policy which could be
issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement." '12 The OCC
argued that examples of activities which could be considered within
the business of insurance were listed by the National Securities Court
as the fixing of rates, selling and advertising of policies, and licensing
of companies and agents." The OCC concluded that the Texas In-
surance Code provisions "regulate neither the 'transferring or
spreading [of] a policyholder's risk,' nor any other practice that is 'an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured.' ,1 4As such, they did not regulate the business of insurance,
but instead sought to regulate the activities of national banks, a
power not vested in state insurance authorities.
The actual scope of the OCC Interpretive Letter extended only
to the sale of annuities by national banks acting as agents. The ADC
court held that Illinois may regulate the sale of the Retirement CD
due to the McCarran-Ferguson preemption of the National Bank
Act. In effect, the ADC court allowed Illinois to prohibit the sale of
the Retirement CD and other annuity products by national banks.
Although issuance and underwriting of the annuity product is
touched upon throughout the decision, the ADC court fails to include
the same language in its holding, perhaps allowing that prohibition to
Schachter, 84 F.3d 834, 847-48 (1995) (Flaum, C.J., dissenting).
181. OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993) (" '[T]he business of insurance' should be read to
single out one activity from others, not to distinguish one entity from another.")).
182. Id. (citing SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453,459 (1969)).
183. See id. (citing National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. at 460).
184. This conclusion applies the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) and relied upon by the ADC ma-
jority. Additionally, the OCC builds on this conclusion using a standard issued in
Owensboro Natl Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 134 L. Ed. 2d
519 (1996). The OCC stated:
Excluding national banks as a group from even qualifying to obtain licenses to
sell annuities does not transfer or spread policyholder risk; it is not an integral
part of the relationship between an insurer and its insured, and it is not aimed at
a practice limited to entities within the insurance industry.
OCC Interpretive Letter 749, supra note 151.
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be implied.""
The second OCC action which augmented the power of national
banks was the release of new regulations regarding operating subsidi-
aries."" Under the new regulations, national banks can create
operating subsidiaries which can engage in a wide range of activities,
including activities for which the parent bank would be ineligible."
A detailed report on the full range of activities and applications
available to banks under the OCC's new regulations is beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, highlighting the regulations and
their anticipated effect on instruments like the Retirement CD and
on the conflict between banks and insurance companies is necessary
to appreciate the shifting environment in which the banking industry
will find itself in the near future.
Under the new regulations, a national bank must obtain OCC
approval before establishing, acquiring, or commencing new activities
within an operating subsidiary." Most notably, the regulations allow
the OCC to require a legal analysis of the proposed venture in cases
of novel, complex, or legally unresolved activities or issues."9 The
OCC also encourages pre-filing meetings with OCC staff in these
cases."9 Once approved, the subsidiary may engage in a broad range
185. Underwriting and issuing an annuity is obviously the first step before marketing
and sale can take place. It also involves an assumption of risk of loss on the issuer's part
tied directly to the annuitant outliving his or her life expectancy, resulting in a diminished
return or loss to the issuer as the lifetime payments continue. Since the sale of an annuity
does not entail that same risk, it can be implied that, by allowing the regulation and pro-
hibition of annuity sales, annuity underwriting would also be prohibited as an activity
needing the same or even more regulation due to the higher risk to the institution and, as
an extension, to its customers.
186. The full text of the new regulations is to be published in 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1996)
and became effective December 31, 1996. For the purpose of context, the rules appear in
Title 12-Banks and Banking; Chapter I-Comptroller of the Currency, Department of
the Treasury; Part 5-Rules, Policies, Procedures for Corporate Activities; Subpart C-
Expansion of Activities; § 5.34 Operating Subsidiaries.
187. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34).
188. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(b) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.34(e)(1)(i)(A)). Under these subsections, the bank must provide the OCC with com-
prehensive information about the subsidiary and its proposed operation in the initial
application. "Necessary" information includes: a complete description of the bank's in-
vestment in the subsidiary, the proposed activities of the subsidiary, and the locale for the
subsidiary's activity (i.e. at the main office, a branch or elsewhere). The actual applica-
tion procedure will differ depending on the activity.
189. The inclusion of this provision will allow the OCC to accomplish two important
tasks: (1) prudently addressing and evaluating the still politically and legally troublesome
topics like insurance underwriting and the Retirement CD; and (2) proactively curbing
any attempt to abuse the depth and breadth of the new regulations.
190. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1)(i)(A)).
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of activities, including "activities which are not permissible for the
parent bank itself.. 91
The new regulations detail the application and approval proc-
ess.9  Several application procedures are available to a national bank
depending on the activity in which it wishes the operating subsidiary
to engage. The three main types of application and OCC review are
(1) notice process for "adequately capitalized" or "well capitalized"
national banks,9" (2) expedited review, 94 and (3) no application or
notice required."' Additional requirements exist for subsidiaries
which intend to exercise investment discretion" or which intend to
exercise powers which the parent bank would be unable to exercise
itself."'
While the banking industry cheered the new OCC regulations,
the initial Congressional response was significantly less enthusiastic.'98
The House Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach accused the
OCC of attempting to enhance its own regulatory position in relation
to that of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), which oversees bank
holding companies!' " In fact, Leach stated that "[t]he Treasury is ex-
191. Wilke & Frank, supra note 15, at A2. The new OCC regulations state: "A na-
tional bank may establish or acquire an operating subsidiary to conduct or may conduct in
an existing operating subsidiary, activities that are part of or incidental to the business of
banking, as determined by the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 24(seventh) ..... 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1)).
192. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e) and (f)).
193. The general application process will be described in 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2)(i).
The operating subsidiary activities which require this form of notice and application will
be detailed extensively in 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2)(ii). "Adequately capitalized" and "well
capitalized" are defined in part 6 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
194. The general application process will be described in 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3)(i).
This expedited review method allows the bank to assume approval if it does not hear oth-
erwise from the OCC within 30 days from the receipt of the application by the OCC. The
OCC may also "impose additional conditions in connection with any approval under this
section." The activities allowed under an expedited review application to be detailed in
12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3)(ii).
195. No application or notice is required if the bank is adequately or well capitalized
and meets the conditions described under 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(4)(i)-(iv). These conditions
basically entail prior and continuing approval of both an operating subsidiary and its ac-
tivities.
196. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(5)).
197. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(0). The addi-
tional requirements include public notice and comment for activities previously
unapproved by the OCC and specific corporate requirements such as physical separate-
ness for the subsidiary, different names for the bank and its subsidiary to avoid consumer
confusion, adequate capitalization for the subsidiary and separate corporate formalities.
198. See Wilke & Frank, supra note 15, at A2.
199. The Fed responded to the OCC regulations with its own regulatory proposal that
would eliminate restrictions on its constituent state banks, thereby facilitating their ability
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tremely concerned [about] the role of the Comptroller's office. It
feels that if you give authority through holding company umbrellas,
its role will diminish substantially, whereas if you give powers to the
bank itself, its role will increase substantially."' Leach also ex-
pressed concern that further empowering banks would add to their
incentive to derail legislative efforts at financial modernization.2 0 '
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Alfonse D'Amato said that he
"was 'deeply concerned' and charged that the rules could 'subject
federally insured banks to excessive risks and expose bank-insurance
funds, and therefore taxpayers, to unnecessary liability.""2 2 D'Amato
added that "[t]he comptroller's action detracts from the emerging
consensus in favor of comprehensive reform and can only lead to
controversy and protracted litigation."' 3
Insurance and security industry representatives have also been
critical of bank expansion in general, citing interrelated issues of con-
sumer protection and fair competition.' Consumer protection issues
cover a wide range of potential problems, including Senator
D'Amato's concern over exposing federally insured funds to exces-
sive risk as banks enter new fields with inherently different, and
greater, risks. Industry groups cite other problems with the commin-
gling of banking and other industries. Three of these problems are
tying, coercion, and customer confusion.'5 Tying and coercion are
related and involve the potential bundling of loan and insurance
products.' Tying and coercion can arise either intentionally, during
the loan application process, or unintentionally, as a result of the
consumer's desire to please the bank during loan negotiations. 7
Crucial to these concepts is the premise that consumers are in a vul-
to compete with the OCC's national banks. Two examples of restrictions under review
are: (1) the Fed requirement that a bank own 100% of its operating subsidiary (versus
the OCC's 80% requirement); and (2) the extent to which a state bank can invest in part-
nerships and limited liability companies (like national bank provisions in the new OCC
regulations). If the removal of the restrictions is approved, state banks in the 41 states
with "wild card" statutes would find themselves essentially on par with national banks.
Wild card statutes allow state chartered banks to engage in any activity done by a na-
tional bank. See Fed Proposal Cutting Restrictions on State Banks, CFO ALERT, Dec. 16,
1996.
200. Morrison, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Jim Leach).
201. See id.
202. Wilke & Frank, supra note 15, at A2.
203. Id.
204. See Dave McDaniel, Banks Face Sales Barriers As Agents Lobby States, BEST'S






nerable position when applying for much needed credit and may see
the bundling of insurance offerings with loan applications as a pre-
requisite for loan approval or at least a factor which might improve
their application status. In addition, customers may be confused and
believe that bank-offered insurance carries the same FDIC protec-
tion that deposits carry.'
However, neither the Congressional criticism nor that of insur-
ance and security industry opponents addresses the issue of oversight,
generally, or of the OCC provisions for oversight promulgated in the
new regulations, specifically. Issues of tying and consumer confusion
have been addressed by the OCC in provisions that would require
banks' subsidiaries to be physically separate and carry different
names when engaging in activities not permissible for the parent
bank.' Representative Leach's proposals would give the Fed over-
sight responsibilities for the new investment bank holding companies
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight of any
securities activity within the holding companies.210 The financial
modernization bill would also incorporate the new OCC regula-
tions.21' These delegations of authority seem to include an inherent
approval of administrative oversight for the protection of consumers.
Absent distrust of the OCC's ability to oversee new bank activi-
ties and guard against excessive consumer risk, Congress' initial
response as well as that of competing industry groups must be inter-
preted warily. Congress expressed concern about the OCC making
sweeping rule changes without Congress' express delegation of
authority. It also closely monitored competition between the OCC
and the Fed for bank charters and oversight authority. The insurance
and securities industries want a level playing field in the form of
equal expansion possibilities for each group. Congress questioned
the legality of the OCC's actions since they were taken without prior
Congressional authorization. The OCC commented that it had de-
layed finalizing the new rules for over a year to give Congress a
chance to act. 12 During that year, Congressional leaders failed to
harness a political consensus, and consequently, the financial mod-
ernization bill was stalled.213 Thus, the OCC stepped in to initiate the
208. See id.
209. See 61 Fed. Reg. 64,006 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34).
210. See Morrison, House Banking Chairman, supra note 1, at 7-8.
211. See id. at 5.
212. See Banks in U.S. Can Now Enter New Businesses, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 21,
1996 [hereinafter Banks in U.S.].
213. See Wilke & Frank, supra note 15, at A2.
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process of modernization itself.
The new regulations will open business opportunities which have
long been available to European banks.
Starting with the London Stock Exchange's Big Bang in
1986, deregulation has progressively opened up banks' ac-
cess to securities trading on national stock exchanges. In
many European countries, banks also sell not only life-
insurance policies but household insurance and a range of
other products. The concept, known as Allfinanz in Ger-
many and banque-assurance in French, is based on the idea
that consumers increasingly will want to do the bulk of their
financial business with a single institution, providing it can
offer them quality service at competitive prices, rather than
dealing with a range of suppliers.2
All of these issues-turf, authority, oversight, world competi-
tiveness, and inter-industry fairness-will be considered by the one-
hundred-fifth Congress under the consensus-building efforts of Rep-
resentative Leach and Senator D'Amato.
V. CONCLUSION
A snapshot of the law surrounding the Retirement CD may
seem blurry. In fact, the gradual meshing of the banking and insur-
ance industries has created much uncertainty. The Retirement CD
has been rendered ineffective as a retirement investment and stands
as a casualty in the turf war between banks and insurance companies.
Under the holding of ADC, the Retirement CD is preempted by state
insurance law in the Seventh Circuit. Because the United States Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in ADC,25 the Court denied the
Retirement CD consistent status nationally, thereby rendering it vul-
nerable to state-by-state restriction. In addition, some degree of
marketability was lost when Congress stripped the Retirement CD of
FDIC insurance. Most significantly, the proposed IRS denial of tax-
deferred status effectively removed the last advantages of the Re-
tirement CD as a retirement savings vehicle.216
The new OCC regulations certainly bolster the hopes of entities
like Blackfeet and ADC to enter the annuity market and compete
with the traditionally powerful insurance companies."7 However, the
214. Banks in U.S., supra note 212.
215. See American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 117 S. Ct. 185 (1996) (denying the peti-
tion for certiorari).
216. For further discussion, see supra note 30.
217. The OCC regulations may be found at section 5.34 of title 12 of the Code of Fed-
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new regulations do not offer relief from the Seventh Circuit ruling
since a separate and distinct operating subsidiary would still be re-
quired.18 For relatively small national banks, like Blackfeet, the
formation of a new subsidiary might still be an impediment to entry
into the marketplace.
It is also not clear how far the OCC regulations go toward bank
expansion and financial modernization. 9 Some see the move as a
broad step forward. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said the new
rules will stimulate competition, leading to lower costs for consumers
and making financial services more widely available and will also
"reduce risk and strengthen the banking system over the long
term."m° Other experts are more guarded with their optimism. H.
Rodgin Cohen commented, "[t]he Comptroller is the gatekeeper and
he has removed the padlock from the gate. How wide he opens the
gate remains to be seen. I do not think we're going to see some sort
of revolution occur quickly.
''2 1
Financial modernization holds the key to the future of hybrid in-
vestments like the Retirement CD and the expansion of banks into
insurance activities. However, the best tool available to ascertain the
depth and breadth of the financial modernization package which is
ultimately passed by Congress is a crystal ball. Too many factors re-
main in flux. To pass a truly comprehensive reform, three major
players will need to come to the table and leave satisfied: the bank-
ing industry, the insurance industry, and the securities industry.
Representative Leach's vision of banking industry reluctance to
compromise could come true. The gains made by the banking indus-
try from Barnett, NationsBank, and OCC and Fed regulations far
outweigh the potential losses from ADC.' Insurance and securities
lobbyists will definitely demand parity and competitive equality be-
fore allowing significant reform to pass unfettered. It is conceivable
that another session of Congress may pass without significant ad-
eral Regulation.
218. See ADC, 84 F.3d at 837.
219. The OCC regulates only nationally chartered banks. The Fed oversees about
1,000 of the state-chartered banks (many of which would benefit from the removal of
restrictions proposed by the Fed). The FDIC oversees the rest of the approximately 6,700
state-chartered banks.
220. Wilke & Frank, supra note 15, at A2.
221. Id.
222. The primary loss for national banks under ADC is state regulation of the Retire-
ment CD, at least in the Seventh Circuit. At most, selling and underwriting annuities by
national banks could be threatened by the decision. However, the new OCC regulations
address this activity favorably by allowing it to be done by operating subsidiaries follow-
ing OCC approval.
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vancement as banks guard their gains and await the early returns
from battles within the states and any lawsuits in which state insur-
ance regulators challenge the OCC's stance on McCarran-Ferguson
preemption. However, Congress will demand some measure of co-
operation and compromise from the banks and good faith negotiation
would be more likely to facilitate retention of present gains than
would outright resistance.
Although the scope, effectiveness, and legality of the new OCC
regulations have been questioned, Representative Leach has said that
the new regulations will be incorporated into his revamped financial
modernization bill.m Even if some of the broader provisions are
overruled by Congress, the OCC actions and the corresponding Fed
response have fired a shot over the bow of would-be Congressional
financial reformers. The administrative agencies have spoken and
the Supreme Court appears content with Barnett and NationsBank
for the time being. The ball is now in Congress' court.
JOHN JAYE
223. See Morrison, House Banking Chairman, supra note 1, at 5.
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